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Agreements between firms
Introduction
Any contract between ﬁrms limits the freedom of the parties involved. Even a
simple contract to deliver 100 widgets next month at price €1,000 restricts the
buyer’s ability to switch to a lower-cost provider in the meantime and, if there
are capacity constraints, also the seller’s ability to supply one of the buyer’s
rivals. This is an example of a simple vertical contract. Such contracts are the
essence of everyday business practice. They enhance the efﬁciency of trade
and encourage investment. Freedom to engage in such contracts and the
institutional environment that allows them to be enforced are essential ingre-
dients to a well-performing market. The competition problems arise when
contracts are used beyond this to include clauses that more directly exclude or
suppress competition. Horizontal agreements (i.e. between alternative suppli-
ers) ring a very direct warning bell of coordination for customer exploitation.
When the agreement is vertical (i.e. between buyer and supplier) competition
concerns usually relate to the potential exclusion of rivals which may then
indirectly harm consumers. The common theme in this part of the book is the
identiﬁcation and deterrence of agreements that are harmful in their effects.
All of the cases in the following chapters relate to the enforcement of
Article 81 of the EU Treaty (or the equivalent national provision). Article 81
prohibits any agreements or concerted practices ‘which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market’. Examples include agreements that ‘directly or indirectly
ﬁx purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions’, ‘share markets
or sources of supply’ or ‘apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transac-
tions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive dis-
advantage’. If a contract breaks the Article 81 prohibition, it is illegal and
cannot be enforced. However, unlike the Article 82 prohibition, it is possible
to argue for exemption under Article 81(3). This allows an agreement ‘which
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contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting beneﬁt’. Either an individual agreement may be
exempted or, in the case where a particular type of agreement is common-
place, a class of agreements satisfying certain properties may be given a block
exemption (usually relating to a particular industry).1
The ﬁrst pair of cases relates to secret price-ﬁxing cartels, for which there is
no possibility of exemption. Cartels have become a major priority for EC
competition policy. The main economic harms are textbook monopoly price
raising and the stiﬂing of the wider competitive process of improving offers to
ﬁght for customers. Although econometric evidence can be used to identify
suspicious pricing patterns, there is little subtle economics in identifying a
cartel.2 EC investigation of international cartels has frequently been prompted
by prior discovery by authorities in the US. The evidence usually comes from a
whistleblower or incriminating documents and e-mails found in a ‘dawn raid’
on businesses under suspicion. In order to encourage whistleblowing, the EC
ﬁrst introduced a leniency scheme in 1996, with the latest revision in 2006.
Leniency offers a reduction of the ﬁne if a ﬁrm comes forward with evidence of
a cartel, even if it has been a participant in the recent past.
The graphite electrodes cartel was a global conspiracy involving eight sup-
pliers in Europe. They were ﬁned a total of around €170 million. Hviid and
Stephan examine the theory of optimal deterrence to see whether this level of
ﬁnes is sufﬁcient to deter ﬁrms that are economicallymotivated (i.e. do not obey
the law on ethical grounds). They then apply deterrence theory to the case in
hand. Fines ranged from less than 1 per cent to 6 per cent of turnover. These are
small percentages relative to the price-raising capability of a cartel. They are
unlikely to sufﬁce for economic deterrence, especially given the chance of not
being caught. The authors work through the EC ﬁning guidelines applied and
highlight further weaknesses in the incentives they create. Many of these weak-
nesses survive in the 2006 revision and the authors conclude that the EC is still
not creating the right incentive for ﬁrms not to participate in future cartels.
If a cartel’s customers were expected to sue for damages, this would be an
additional disincentive to their formation. The US system of treble damages is
a potent force for litigation across the Atlantic. European legal systems allow
1 The legal niceties need not concern us here, but the legality of restrictive agreements can potentially be
argued either under Article 81(1) as pro-competitive or under Article 81(3) as having offsetting
efﬁciencies such that consumers beneﬁt. The essential economic analysis is the same for both, although
the latter is clearer in focusing on the effect on consumers.
2 See Porter (2005).
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only for single damages (i.e. a victim can claim only for losses shown to have
been incurred). Given the chance of losing, this gives a very much reduced
incentive to litigate for damages except when law ﬁrms offer contingency fees
following a successful case brought by a competition authority. Even this is rare
in Europe because of problems in proving the degree of harm. However, the EC
is actively trying to encourage private actions.3 Møllgaard considers the district
heating pipe cartel in Denmark, Italy andGermany. This ten-member cartel was
ﬁned €87 million. It took ten years between the ﬁrst dawn raid and rejection of
the ﬁnal appeal in 2005. Four Danish municipalities won damages of €21 mill-
ion. While the EC has only to prove that a cartel existed, a damage claim
additionally requires an estimate of the actual harm incurred by the customer.
This requires an estimate of how much prices were elevated and how much of
this was then passed on to downstream customers. Fortunately, the latter was
not an issue for the municipalities because they did not resell the pipes. The
author describes the range of methods available for estimating damages and
provides an economic critique of the strengths and weaknesses of each.4
The next two cases are not of secret price ﬁxing but of publicly known
collective pricing agreements that can claim to enhance efﬁciency due to the
presence of externalities. Like the chapter on mobile phone calls, they both
involve markets in which there are network externalities between different
groups of customers. These have become known as two-sided markets.
Credit and debit cards are increasingly used as a means of paying for
transactions. They beneﬁt both customers and retailers as convenient alterna-
tives to cash or cheques (e.g. less risk of theft), so bothmight be charged for their
use. When the customer has a card issued by a different bank to the one used by
the retailer, this opens a third possible charge known as the interchange fee. This
is paid between the banks to compensate for any imbalance of their customer
and retailer transactions. Associations of banks (e.g. Visa, MasterCard) operate
these payment-card systems and set the interchange fee and other rules. The fee
is usually levied on the retailer’s bank and the EC challenged Visa as an
agreement between banks that set the fee well in excess of the cost of the
transaction. The fee is then passed on to retailers as a high price for Visa services.
Rochet identiﬁes the usage externality caused by consumers using a card instead
of cash. They cause banks to incur a cost of administering the transaction and
retailers avoid the cost of handling cash. Interchange fees can be used to
internalise this externality and so reduce distortions in usage. Furthermore,
3 See ECWhite Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules; COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008.
4 Damages are also discussed in Chapter 10.
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competition between banks for customers means that extra revenues gained
from retailers ﬁnd their way into subsidies for customers. The author argues that
careful economicmodelling reveals no systematic bias and very limited justiﬁca-
tion for the Commission’s price-cap remedy.5
The commercialisation of sports creates important interactions between
honest and exciting sporting competition and the economic competition
which is the focus of this book. The highest-proﬁle cases across Europe have
concerned the sale of exclusive TV rights, but competition law can stretch
much further. The UKOFT took the British Horseracing Board (BHB) to task
over a range of its rules (i.e. agreements) relating to the organisation of ﬁxtures
and the way in which non-exclusive rights to take bets were sold to book-
makers. Betting is a distinctive feature of horseracing and has been used to
justify much greater state regulation in countries other than the UK, where
there is a strong governing authority. Lyons analyses the externalities in this
sport to understand the appropriate division between rules supporting good
governance to the beneﬁt of consumers and rules that might be an abuse. He
identiﬁes several groups of ‘consumers’ of the sport, including owners, punters
and spectators. The author develops a simple model to understand the
implications of different types of collective and individual agreement. He
ﬁnds that the OFT’s initial objections to certain rules could have had a
seriously adverse effect on the quality of the product enjoyed by most con-
sumers. The OFT was eventually persuaded to revise its position, but some
ancillary court decisions on database rights have since undermined what had
looked like a good economic effects-based settlement.
The third group of agreements relates to vertical restraints between man-
ufacturers and wholesalers or retailers. Such agreements often have efﬁciency
beneﬁts, including the reduction of double marginalisation,6 but this does not
mean that they cannot also have the effect of distorting competition. Such
cases require careful economic analysis and supporting evidence in order to
balance the overall effect on consumer welfare.
Car manufacturers have traditionally sold their cars through independent
dealerships subject to contracts that limit the commercial freedom of their
dealers in a number of ways. These include exclusive territories (dealers must
not sell to consumers outside a designated area), selective distribution (dealers
must achieve a speciﬁed service level or sell a minimum quantity) and
5 A similar case for MasterCard was settled with a similar remedy in December 2007.
6 Double marginalisation is where successive stages of production and distribution each add markups
which cumulatively may even exceed the integrated monopoly markup.
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exclusive dealing (dealers must not sell cars made by other manufacturers).
The ﬁrst two soften intrabrand competition between retailers of the same cars
and the third softens interbrand competition between manufacturers (e.g.
making it more difﬁcult for consumers to compare cars or new manufac-
turers to enter a market). However, each restraint can also be justiﬁed on
efﬁciency grounds, for example encouraging dealers to invest in local market-
ing, preventing low-quality retailers from freeriding on the showroom services
provided by others (and so undermining the incentive to provide those
services) or protecting the investment of manufacturers in training and
equipping their dealers. Verboven explores the EC’s attitude to these restraints
in the form of the evolving block exemption under Article 81(3), observing
that the main preoccupation, at least until 2002, was with the commonmarket
rather than balancing competition and efﬁciency. He also takes us through the
economic evidence for efﬁciencies, competition softening and foreclosure
effects in relation to cars. He concludes that the EC is moving in the right
direction but still has some way to go.
Brewers also have a tradition of exclusive dealing in relation to their ‘on-
trade’ (i.e. selling to pubs as distinct from off-licences and supermarkets for
home consumption). The Crehan case concerns both the anticompetitive effect
of a form of such exclusivity and the pursuit of damages for the consequences.
Waterson tells the tale of one publican’s battle against a ‘pubco’ controlled at the
time by the Courage brewery. Pubcos own a large number of pubs which they
lease to tenant publicans. Like thousands of other tenants, Bernie Crehan signed
a lease for his pub, including an exclusive agreement to buy beer only through
the pubco. This is known as tying and is a variant of exclusive dealing – you
cannot have one thing (e.g. a pub or photocopier) without also buying your
supplies (e.g. beer or paper) from the same ﬁrm. The advantage of tying for an
independent pubco is that it can use its buyer power to play off one brewery
against another and so negotiate advantageous terms. Alternatively, a pubco
owned by a brewery secures market share. The problem for the tenants is that
their wholesale price is not part of their exclusive purchasing contract but is
‘negotiated’ under the constraint that the pub cannot buy beer from anyone else.
Nevertheless, this apparently vulnerable position may be compensated by other
beneﬁts or a lower rent. Mr Crehan went bust in 1993 claiming that this was
because his high wholesale price of beer meant he could not compete with
neighbouring pubs that could secure cheaper supplies. Although the case
formally relates to just one poor publican, it was expected to set a wide-ranging
precedent and it reached the highest courts in both the UK and the EU.
Waterson sets out the economic analysis and documents the twists and turns
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of the legal process. He concludes that the ﬁnal outcomewas a victory for arcane
legal argument over economic analysis. The case provides a vivid example of the
dangers of arguing competition cases before non-specialist courts – especially
when it takes thirteen years to reach a conclusion!
The car-distribution block exemption touches on the EC preoccupation
with unimpeded trade in a common European market, but the Glaxo case
brings it into sharp focus. The case relates to a practice under which Glaxo
sold its medicines to Spanish wholesalers at prices differentiated according to
where the medicine would be consumed. Thus, the price for a medicine to be
sold in Spain was set at the level mandated by Spanish price regulation, but the
same wholesaler would have to pay more for supplies to be re-exported to
countries willing to pay more, notably the UK. While not explicitly prohibit-
ing parallel trade (i.e. trade by arbitragers in parallel to that by the original
manufacturer), the practice had the same effect. The EC prohibited this dual-
pricing agreement on per se grounds that it impeded trade in the common
market. Glaxo appealed the decision. Venit and Rey argue that restraints on
parallel trade should not be per se illegal and each case should be assessed on
its economic merits. They draw on the economics of price discrimination and
argue that the EC should have taken account of the fact that pharmaceuticals
prices are regulated by national purchasing policies. For example, in the
absence of any restraints, low-price countries might not be supplied. Also, if
parallel trade was allowed and this drove price down to that of the lowest
regulated price, this would undermine R&D incentives. Thus, the Glaxo
agreement was in principle justiﬁable on the grounds of consumer beneﬁt.
In 2006, the CFI agreed that restraints on parallel trade should be judged on
consumer welfare grounds (i.e. the economic approach). This case shows how
the courts can be a positive force for good economic analysis, in particular in
promoting consumer welfare as the ultimate focus for competition policy.7
7 Other examples of positive inﬂuence can be found in Chapters 14 and 17. Note that while the CFI is not a
truly specialised court, competition-related cases form the bulk of its work (unlike for most of the courts
deciding Crehan).
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